Abstract Due to the multiplicity of loci of control, a main issue distributed systems have to cope with lies in the uncertainty on the system state created by the adversaries that are asynchrony, failures, dynamicity, mobility, etc. Considering message-passing systems, this paper considers the uncertainty created by the net effect of asynchrony and process crash failures in systems where the processes are anonymous (i.e., processes have no identity and locally execute the same algorithm). Trivially, agreement problems such as consensus, that cannot be solved in non-anonymous asynchronous systems prone to process failures, cannot be solved either if the system is anonymous. The paper investigates failure detectors that allow processes to circumvent this impossibility. It has several contributions. It first presents four failure detectors (denoted AP, AP, AΩ, and AΣ) and show that they are the "identity-free" counterparts of perfect failure detectors, eventual leader failure detectors, and quorum failure detectors, respectively. AΣ is new and showing that AΣ and Σ have the same computability power in a non-anonymous system is not trivial. The paper also shows that the notion of failure detector reduction is related to the computation model. Then, the paper presents and proves correct a uniform anonymous consensus algorithm based on the failure detector pair (AΩ, AΣ) ("uniform" means here that not only processes have no identity, but no process is aware of the total number of processes). This new algorithm is not a simple "straightforward extension" of an algorithm designed for non-anonymous systems. To benefit from AΣ, it uses a novel broadcast facility which encapsulates an AΣ-based message exchange pattern that provides the processes with an interesting intersection property on the set of messages they have exchanged. Finally, the paper discusses the notions of failure detector hierarchy, weakest failure detector for anonymous consensus, and the implementation of identity-free failure detectors in anonymous systems.
Introduction
Anonymous systems One of the main issues faced by distributed computing lies in mastering the uncertainty created by adversaries such as asynchrony and failures. As a simple example, the net effect of these adversaries makes impossible for a process to know if another process has crashed or is only very slow. Recently, new facets of uncertainty (e.g., dynamicity, mobility) have appeared and made distributed computing even more challenging.
Among the many adversaries that distributed computing has to cope with, anonymity is particularly important. It occurs when the computing entities (processes, agents, sensors, etc.) have no name, and consequently cannot distinguish the ones from the others. It is worth noticing that, from a practical point of view, anonymity is a first class property as soon as one is interested in guaranteeing privacy. As an example, some peer-to-peer file-sharing systems assume the peers are anonymous [11] . In the same vein, not all the sensor networks assume that each sensor has a proper identity [2, 16] .
One of the very first works (to our knowledge) that addressed anonymous systems is the work of Angluin [1] . In that paper, considering message passing systems, Angluin was mainly interested in computability issues, namely answering the question "which functions can be computed in presence of asynchrony and anonymity?" The leader election problem is a simple example of a problem that is unsolvable in such a setting (intuitively, this is because symmetry cannot be broken in presence of both asynchrony and anonymity). Other works have then addressed anonymity in particular settings such as ring networks [3] , or networks with a regular structure [21] . Failure-free message passing anonymous systems have also been investigated in [28, 29] where is given a characterization of problems solvable in this context according to which amount on information about network attributes are initially known by the processes.
Enriching a system with a failure detector Failure detectors [10] are one of the most popular approaches to circumvent impossibility results in non-anonymous failure-prone asynchronous systems. Roughly speaking, a failure detector is a device that provides each process with failure-related information. According to the quality of this information, several types of failure detectors can be defined. As an example, let us consider the consensus problem. This problem, that cannot be solved in a pure asynchronous message-passing system prone to even a single process crash [17] , is defined as follows. Each process proposes a value, and every process that does not crash has to decide a value (termination), such that a decided value is a proposed value (validity), and no two processes decide different values (agreement). It has been shown that the eventual leader failure detector denoted Ω is the weakest failure detector that allows consensus to be solved in message-passing asynchronous systems where a majority of processes never crash [9] . It has also been shown that the pair (Σ, Ω), where Σ is a quorum failure detector [13] , is the weakest failure detector to solve consensus in non-anonymous systems when any number of processes may crash [13, 14] . (These failure detectors are precisely defined later in the paper.)
Failure detectors and anonymous systems
The local output of a failure detector Ω is a process identity. Similarly, the local output of a failure detector P (perfect failure detector) [10] or Σ [13] is a set of process identities. While these failure detectors can be added to an anonymous distributed system, their outputs cannot be directly used by the anonymous processes for the simple reason that there is no "process identity" notion inside the system. This means that (the output of) Ω is useless in an anonymous system. As far as the output of P or Σ is concerned, an anonymous process can only exploit the cardinality of the identity set that is currently output. As we will see, this cardinal value can be exploited if the failure detector is P, while it cannot if it is Σ.
Differently from Ω, P, or Σ, failure detectors have been proposed that, while used in non-anonymous systems, neither output process identities nor associate values with process identities. We call them identity-free failure detectors. As an example, the failure detector L, that outputs a Boolean value at every process has been introduced in [15] , where it is shown to be the weakest failure detector for the (n − 1)-set agreement problem in n-process asynchronous messagepassing systems prone to any number of crashes. This failure detector has been generalized in [5] .
A failure detector, denoted here AP, that outputs an approximation of the number of crashed processes has been proposed in [23, 24] . This failure detector has been used in [6] to solve consensus in anonymous systems prone to any number t < n of process crashes. It has also been shown in [6] that, in an anonymous system enriched with such a failure detector, 2t + 1 is a lower bound on the number of rounds for consensus (in a non-anonymous system enriched with a perfect failure detector, this lower bound is t + 1).
Content of the paper
This paper is on failure detectors suited to anonymous asynchronous message-passing systems prone to any number of process crashes. It has several contributions.
-It first introduces a new failure detector, denoted AΣ, and shows that it is the identity-free counterpart of the failure detector Σ (quorum failure detector).
While Σ provides each process with a set of process identities that satisfies an intersection property, the main issue encountered in defining its identity-free counterpart AΣ lies in capturing properties on set cardinals from which an intersection property can be extracted. This capture is not trivial, as demonstrated by the construction of Σ from AΣ in a non-anonymous system which is particularly subtle. (Contrarily, the construction of AΣ from Σ in a non-anonymous system is simple.) The paper also presents the failure detectors AP, AP and AΩ which are the identity-free counterparts of P (perfect failure detector), P (a variant of P) and Ω (eventual leader failure detector), respectively. A novel (bounded and quiescent) construction of a failure detector of P from AP in a nonanonymous system is presented. -The paper presents then a communication abstraction which encapsulates the use of AΣ. It consists in a novel message exchange pattern composed of a finite number of asynchronous communication phases (the number of these internal communication phases depends on the output of AΣ). Hence, this abstraction hides an AΣ-based sophisticated communication pattern to the upper layer while providing it with well-defined properties. The most important of these properties is an intersection property on the messages received by the processes. -The paper presents then an algorithm, based on the pair of failure detectors AΣ and AΩ, that solves the consensus problem in an anonymous system whatever the number t of processes that may crash. In addition of being anonymous, the algorithm is also strongly anonymous in the sense that no process is required to know the total number n of processes. The fact that Σ and Ω are useless in anonymous systems has motivated the design of their identity-free counterparts. The fact that (Σ, Ω) is the weakest failure detector to solve consensus in a non-anonymous system despite any number of process crashes [14] has motivated the design of an (AΣ, AΩ)-based anonymous consensus algorithm and poses the question of the weakest failure detector for anonymous consensus. This algorithm adopts the structure of the non-anonymous consensus algorithm presented in [26] : processes execute asynchronous rounds and each round is made up of three communication phases. While in a non-anonymous system, the use of quorums [25] allows a process to broadcast a message and then wait for messages from a given set of processes, this is no longer possible in an anonymous system. To solve this problem, the proposed algorithm uses the previously defined communication abstraction. -The paper finally discusses the "weakest failure detector" notion for anonymous consensus. As an example, while P is strictly stronger than Ω in a non-anonymous system, their identity-free counterparts AP and AΩ are incomparable. The paper addresses also the implementation of identity-free failure detectors in anonymous synchronous systems. Both AP and AΣ can be implemented in such systems and are consequently realistic [12] .
Roadmap The paper is made up of 8 sections. The anonymous distributed computation model is presented in Sect. 2. Section 3 presents the four identity-free failure detectors AP, AP, AΩ, and AΣ. Section 4 addresses failure detector reductions and shows that AΣ and Σ are equivalent in non-anonymous systems. This section also discusses the notion of failure detector hierarchy and the implementability of anonymous failure detectors. Section 5 presents the communication abstraction which encapsulates an AΣ-based communication pattern. Section 6 presents an (AΣ, AΩ)-based consensus algorithm for strongly anonymous asynchronous systems. Section 7 discusses the "weakest failure detector" issue for anonymous consensus. Finally Sect. 8 concludes the paper.
Anonymous asynchronous message-passing systems
Process model The system is made up of a fixed number n of processes, denoted p 1 , . . . , p n . Π = {1, . . . , n} denotes the set of process identities (also called indexes).
Processes are anonymous in the sense that no process knows the existence of indexes and all processes execute the same algorithm. This means that indexes can only be used from an external observer point of view: they do not belong to the system as perceived by processes. The processes are asynchronous in the sense that there is no assumption on their respective speeds.
Anonymous versus strongly anonymous
When not explicitly indicated, the anonymous model does not prevent the processes from knowing n (the total number of processes). In order to prevent confusion, we say that the model is strongly anonymous when no process is aware of the value of n.
Time model The underlying time model is the set of positive integers (denoted N). Time instants are denoted τ , τ , etc.
Similarly to indexes, this time notion is not accessible to the processes. It is only used from an external observer point of view to state or prove properties. More generally, but for process identities, the computation model is the same as in [10] .
Failure model A process executes correctly its algorithm until it possibly crashes. A crash is a premature stop; after it has crashed, a process executes no step. A process that does not crash in a run is correct in that run. Otherwise, it is faulty in that run. Until it crashes (if ever it does), a process is alive.
An environment is a set of failure patterns, where a failure pattern [10] is a function F : N → 2 Π such that F(τ ) denotes the set of processes that have crashed by time τ . For a given failure pattern F, we define the set of crashed processes crashed(F) = ∪ τ ∈N F(τ ) and the set of correct processes correct (F) = Π \ crashed(F). We consider here failure patterns in which all (but one) processes may crash in a run. This set of failure patterns is called wait-free environment.
Communication The processes communicate by exchanging messages through reliable channels, i.e., there is no creation, duplication or alteration of messages. These channels are asynchronous, which means that there is no assumption on message transit delays, except that they are positive and finite (every message eventually arrives).
The processes are provided with a broadcast() communication primitive that allows the invoking process to send the same message to all the processes (including itself). When it receives a message, a process cannot determine which process is its sender. If the process p i that issues an invocation of broadcast() does not crash during its invocation, the message is received by all the processes (possibly at different time instants). If it crashes during its invocation, the message is received by an arbitrary subset of processes. Such a broadcast primitive is sometimes called best effort broadcast. Notations The previous model is denoted AAS [∅] . AAS is an acronym for Anonymous Asynchronous System; ∅ means that there is no additional assumption. AS [∅] is then used to denote the non-anonymous counterpart of AAS [∅] , i.e., an Asynchronous message-passing System prone to any number of crash failures and where each process has a distinct identity and knows all process identities [4, 22] .
Failure detectors

Definition of failure detectors
The following definitions, based on Π and the set N of time instants, are from [10] 
A few classical failure detectors
This section recall the definition of three well-known failure detectors, namely, P, Ω, and Σ and also the definition of P (a simple variant of P). While they have been designed for non-anonymous systems, nothing prevents us from enriching an anonymous system with any of them (but, as shown below, it is possible that such an "enrichment" does not add computational power to the anonymous system). In the following definitions, we simplify some logical terms, when there is no ambiguity; for example ∀τ means ∀τ ∈ N.
The perfect failure detector P The perfect failure detector [10] provides each process p i with a local set variable denoted suspected i 1 that contains process indexes and is 1 The read-only local variable suspected i corresponds to the output H (i, −) of the failure detector P. In all formal definitions, we keep the classical formalism H (i, τ). The notation suspected i is however used in the code of algorithms (and in their proofs), where it is needed to distinguish different failure detectors. The same remark applies to the such that it (1) never contains the index of a process before it crashes and (2) eventually contains the indexes of all faulty processes. Formally, ∀F ∀H ∈ P(F)
When considering AAS[P]
, it is important to notice that while the values that are currently in suspected i are meaningless for p i (e.g., p i cannot use such a value to send a message to a process and only to it), this process can use the integer |suspected i | that provides it with a lower bound on the number of crashed processes.
The perfect failure detector P This failure detector provides each process p i with a local set variable denoted alive i that contains process indexes and is such that it (1) contains at least the indexes of the processes that are currently alive and (2) eventually contains only the indexes of correct processes. Intuitively, the output of P corresponds to the complement set of the output of P with respect to Π the set of indexes. Formally, ∀F ∀H ∈ P(F)
The eventual leader failure detector Ω The eventual leader failure detector Ω [9] provides each process p i with a local variable leader i that contains a process index such that eventually (1) the variables leader i of the non-faulty processes contain forever the same index and (2) this index is the one of a non-faulty process. Formally, ∀F ∀H ∈ Ω(F)
The same remark as the one done for AAS[P] applies to AAS [Ω] . More precisely, the output of Ω is useless in AAS [Ω] in the sense that it cannot be used by a process to send a message only (i.e., without sending copies to all processes) to the process whose "identity" is output by Ω. The quorum failure detector Σ The notion of quorum has been introduced in [18] (and explicitly used to solve consensus in [25] ). The quorum failure detector Σ [13] provides each process with a local set variable denoted sigma i that contains process indexes (such a set is called quorum) and is such that (1) any two quorum values do intersect (whatever the time instants at which these quorum values have been output) and (2) eventually, any quorum contains only correct processes. Formally, ∀F ∀H ∈ Σ(F)
It is shown in [13] that Σ is the weakest failure detector to implement a register in an asynchronous message-passing system prone to any number of crashes. A simple proof of this result appears in [7] .
Identity-free failure detectors
As seen in the Introduction, some failure detectors do not output process identities (or values associated with process identities) but Boolean values, integers, etc. whose "meaning" is on the entire system. As already indicated, we call them identity-free failure detectors. This section recalls the definition of three of them ( AP, AP, and AΩ) and introduces a new one (AΣ) that is the identity-free counterpart of Σ. As we will see later, "counterpart" means that they have the same computational power in a non-anonymous system. However AΣ is meaningful in an anonymous system, whereas Σ is not.
The identity-free perfect failure detector A P Such a failure detector (a variant of a failure detector introduced in [23, 24] ) provides each process p i with a local integer variable ancp i (approximate number of crashed processes) that (1) is never greater than the number of crashed processes and (2) is eventually equal to the number of faulty processes. Intuitively AP satisfies the same properties as P except that, instead of returning a set of indexes, it simply returns the cardinal of this set. Formally, ∀F ∀H ∈ AP(F)
The identity-free perfect failure detector AP Such a failure detector provides each process p i with an integer anap i (approximate number of alive processes) that (1) is never smaller than the number of alive processes and (2) is eventually equal to the number of correct processes. Intuitively AP satisfies the same properties as P except that, instead of returning a set of indexes, it simply returns the cardinal of this set. Formally, ∀F ∀H ∈ AP(F)
The identity-free eventual leader failure detector AΩ Such a failure detector [19] provides each process p i with a local Boolean variable denoted a_leader i such that eventually (1) there is one non-faulty process (say p ) whose Boolean variable remains forever true and (2) the Boolean variables of the other non-faulty processes remain forever false. Intuitively AΩ satisfies the same properties as Ω. They differ in that eventually all but one Boolean a_leader i become false forever, while Ω eventually provides them with the same process index. Formally, ∀F ∀H ∈ AΩ(F)
The identity-free quorum failure detectors AΣ Such a failure detector outputs a set of pairs at each process. Each pair is composed of a label x and an integer y, and each label appears at most once in a given output. Without loss of generality, the set of labels is assumed to be a subset of N.
If (x, y) appears in the output of AΣ at process p i at time τ , then a pair of the form (x, y ) with y ≤ y is guaranteed to appear in all future times at p i until p i crashes. Intuitively, (x, y) denotes to p i that label x exists and at least y processes know about x (let us notice that this information may be unreliable). Eventually, the output at each correct process stabilizes with respect to label x by having a pair (x, z) in the output and we are guaranteed that the failure detector output at at least z processes eventually contains the label x. Finally, given two pairs (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) in the outputs of the failure detector in a given history, we are guaranteed that every subset T 1 of y1 processes at which label x1 appears and every subset T 2 of y2 processes at which label x2 appears, have a non-empty intersection. As, we will see, a quorum is a set of processes that know the same label.
Formally, the behavior of the failure detector is defined by the following properties. The first two properties (validity and monotonicity) are well-formedness properties, while the last two properties (safety and liveness) are behavioral properties.
Definition 1 S(x)
Interpretation The validity property expresses the fact that, at any time, the output of AΣ is a non-empty set of pairs (x, y) where x is a label and y a number of processes associated with this label (those are processes assumed to know the label x). For any process p i , at any time τ and any label x, x can appear at most once, but any finite number of distinct labels can appear. The monotonicity property states that the number y of processes associated with a label x, as known by p i , can only decrease. This requirement is not necessary but makes things simpler. Not considering this monotonicity property will not change our results but would make them more difficult to understand and proofs more technical. 3 Hence, this property has to be seen as a "comfort" property, and not as a "computability" property.
S(x) is the set of all processes that know the label x. While a process p i knows it belongs to S(x), it does not know the value of S(x). Moreover S(x) can not be used by algorithms; it is only used to define AΣ.
The next property is called liveness because it is used to prove liveness of AΣ-based algorithms (and similarly for the safety property). It captures the fact that, after some time, a quorum contains only correct processes, thereby preventing a correct process from blocking forever if it uses that quorum. To that end, this property states that, for any correct process p i , there is eventually a label x such that its associated number y of processes remains always smaller than or equal to the number of correct processes in S(x). (The underlying intuition is that any correct process will eventually know a label that is associated with a set of correct processes only.)
The safety property is a little bit more involved. It captures the intersection property associated with quorums. Let x 1 and x 2 be two labels known by p i 1 and p i 2 respectively, T 1 any subset of S(x 1 ), T 2 any subset of S(x 2 ) (let us remember that S(x) is the set of all the processes that know label x). The safety property states the following: if |T 1 | = y 1 and
Let us remember that y 1 is the number of processes associated with label x 1 as known by p i 1 (and similarly for y 2 ). The intuition is that the y 1 processes that know label x 1 and y 2 processes that know label x 2 do intersect.
Reductions between failure detectors
Definitions The following definitions are a straightforward generalization of definitions given in [10] . They add the notion of "system model". Given two failure detectors D1 and D2, and a system model C (AAS or AS), D1 is weaker than D2 in C (denoted D1 C D2) if there is an algorithm that emulates the output of the failure detector D1 in C [D2] . If reductions exist in both direction, (i.e., D1 C D2 and D2 C D1), D1 and D2 are equivalent in C (denoted D1 C D2). Finally the notation D1 ≺ C D2 means that D1 is strictly weaker than D2 (i.e., D1 C D2 and D2 C D1). Similarly, if D1 is (strictly) weaker than D2 in C, D2 is said to be (strictly) stronger than D1 in C. If D1 C D2 and D2 C D1, D1 and D2 are said to be not comparable in C.
It is important to notice that the existence of reductions between failure detectors depends on the system model. Given any two failure detectors D1 and D2, as AAS is AS without the notion of process identities, we have
As simple examples (see the proofs below) we have:
Reductions in the non-anonymous model AS
Directly from definitions, one can easily see that P AS P and AP AS AP: for the first equivalence it is sufficient to compute the complement set of the output set with respect to Π the set of all indexes, whereas for the latter it is sufficient to subtract the output integer to n, the total number of processes.
In the following we prove the three equivalences P AS AP, Ω AS AΩ, and AΣ AS Σ. Moreover it is wellknown that Ω ≺ AS P [9, 27] , Σ ≺ AS P [13, 27] , and Ω and Σ are not comparable in AS [13] .
The reductions among the failure detectors are summarized in Fig. 5 and explained in Sect. 4.3. 
P and A P are equivalent in AS
The interested reader can have a look to [8] where is proved a more general equivalence in the model AS n,t which is the classical non-anonymous model where at most t < n processes may crash. We consider here the case of the so-called wait-free environment (t = n − 1).
Building A P in AS[P]
The transformation in that direction is trivial. The reader can easily check that, defining ancp i as |suspected i | constructs the failure detector AP. Fig. 1 . Interestingly, this transformation is bounded (be the execution finite or infinite, the local memory of each process requires only a bounded number of bits). Moreover, (1) the transformation is quiescent (i.e., there is a finite time after which no more messages are exchanged), and (2) the algorithm terminates in the runs where n − 1 processes crash.
Building P in AS[AP] A transformation that builds P in AS[AP] is described in
In order to compute the value of suspected i (that is initialized to ∅), each process p i manages two local variables: -An integer k i , initialized to 0, that represents its current knowledge on the number of processes that have crashed.
= k means that k is the greatest inquiry number for which p i has received the corresponding answer alive(k).
The behavior of p i is defined by four tasks. First, when p i discovers that more than k i processes have crashed, it updates accordingly k i , and broadcasts an inquiry message inquiry (k i ) to all the processes. Let us notice that this task can stop when k i = n − 1 as, due to the model definition, no more crashes can occur. Let us also observe that the messages inquiry(k i ) are sent by p i with increasing values, and due to the safety property of AP, p i knows that there are at most n − k i alive processes.
When p i receives an inquiry(k) message from a process p j it sends back to p j an alive(k) message to indicate that it is still alive. When it receives an answer alive(k) from a process p j , p i learns that p j has answered up to its k-th inquiry, and consequently updates ans i [ j] .
The core of the transformation is the task T 4 that sets the current value of suspected i . It is made up of a repeat statement that is executed until n − 1 processes are locally suspected. (When n − 1 processes have crashed, no more processes can crash and the task can terminate. If less than n − 1 processes crash, the task becomes quiescent -no more messages are sent-but does not terminate.)
The body of the repeat statement is as follows. First, p i sets a local variable m to k i (the number of processes that, to the best of its knowledge, have crashed). Then, p i computes the set X made up of the processes that have not yet answered its m-th inquiry or a more recent one. If the predicate |X | = m is true, p i can safely conclude that the m processes that have not answered its m-th inquiry have crashed (let us recall that, while the tasks T 1 and T 4 proceed asynchronously, p i broadcasts inquiry(m) only after it knows that m processes have crashed). Fig. 1 
Theorem 1 The algorithm described in
is a bounded quiescent construction of P in AS[AP].
Proof Proof of the liveness property P. Let us consider an execution with a given failure pattern F and p i a non-faulty process in this execution. We have to show that if a process p j crashes, after some finite time, j permanently belongs to suspected i . Let f = |crashed(F)|.
There is a finite time τ , after which the f faulty processes have crashed and we have permanently ancp i = f (due to the liveness property of AP), which means that, after some finite time, p i broadcasts a message inquiry( f ). Due to the safety property of AP, this message is sent after the f processes have crashed. Consequently, no crashed process can answer this inquiry message. It follows that, when task T 4 executes with m = k i = f , the set X can only contain the f faulty processes when |X | = f , which concludes the proof of the liveness property.
Proof of the safety property of P. Let p i be any process in an execution with a given failure pattern F. We have to show that no process is added to suspected i before crashing. Let i 1 , . . . , i m be the m process identities that are placed in suspected i during an iteration of task T 4. It follows from the query/response mechanism (implemented by the messages inquiry/alive) used when k i = m, and the safety property of AP, that each of the n −m other processes has answered after these m processes have crashed. Consequently, none of these n − m processes can be part of the m crashed processes. Hence, the set of processes that defines the value ofsuspected i contains only crashed processes.
Proof of boundedness and quiescence. The fact that the construction is bounded and quiescent follows directly from the text of the algorithm: a process broadcast at most one inquiry(k) message for every value of k, and k can take a bounded number of values.
Ω and AΩ are equivalent in AS
Ω and AΩ are equivalent in AS [∅] . The two directions of the equivalence are explained below. The proofs are straightforward and left to the reader.
Building AΩ in AS[Ω]
For any process p i , the current value of the Boolean variable a_leader i of AΩ is computed by the test leader i = i where leader i is the output of Ω. Building Ω in AS[AΩ] The reduction consists in two tasks executed by all processes: (1) Each process p i checks periodically its Boolean a_leader i and, if its value is true, broadcasts a message leader(i) (note that this reduction is done in the non-anonymous model, hence p i knows its identity). (2) When p i receives a message leader(k), it updates its leader i to k.
Σ and AΣ are equivalent in AS: From Σ to AΣ
The construction As AS [Σ] is not anonymous, it is possible for the processes to (statically) enumerate all the possible subsets Q, such that Q = ∅ and Q ⊆ Π . There are 2 n − 1 such subsets. Moreover, the processes are provided with a deterministic function denoted name(). That function associates a label with each set Q, and satisfies the following properties: (a) ∀Q name(Q) ∈ {1, . . . , 2 n − 1}, and (b)
The algorithm building AΣ in AS[Σ] is described in Fig. 2 . Interestingly, this construction is bounded and quiescent. It builds, at each process p i , a set a_sigma i that contains pairs of integers, and ensures that these sets of pairs satisfy the properties defining AΣ. The algorithm is made up of two tasks that are executed at each process p i . 
of the underlying failure detector Σ. In order to ensure the boundedness and quiescence properties, a local set variable sent i (a set of sets) is used to prevent the same quorum to be sent several times. -Task T 2 is associated with the reception of messages quorum(quorum). When such a message is received, p i adds the pair (name(quorum), |quorum|) to the set a_sigma i if i ∈ quorum. Otherwise, p i discards the message. Fig. 2 is a bounded quiescent construction of AΣ in AS [Σ] .
Theorem 2 The algorithm described in
Proof The validity property follows immediately from the definition of the function name(). Moreover since name() is a one-to-one function, there is at most one pair (x, −) associated with a given x. The monotonicity property is then obvious.
Proof of the liveness property of AΣ. Let us consider an execution with a given failure pattern F.
. 4 To that end, let τ 0 be the time instant at which all faulty processes have crashed and their messages have been received and processed. Moreover, let τ 1 be a time instant, such that, ∀τ 1 ≥ τ 1 , sigma τ 1 i contains only correct processes (due to the liveness property of Σ, τ 1 does exist). Finally, let τ ≥ max(τ 0 , τ 1 ).
All the processes that execute after τ are correct. Let i ∈ correct (F). Let quorum be any set obtained by p i after τ . As τ ≥ τ 1 , quorum contains only correct processes, i.e., quorum ⊆ correct (F) (Observation O1).
As p i is a correct process, any correct process p j receives quorum(quorum) and deal with it (if not yet done). From observation O1, all processes of the set quorum receive quorum(quorum). Let us consider a process p j such that j ∈ quorum. Each such p j adds (name(quorum), |quorum|) to a_sigma j if it has not done so yet. It follows that j ∈ S(x). Moreover, it follows from the text of the algorithm that no process p k outside the set quorum adds the pair (name(quorum), |quorum|) to a_sigma k . Consequently we have S(name(quorum)) = quorum (Observation O2). It follows from both observations O1 and O2 that, for any correct process p i , there is a pair (x, y) such that (x, y) = (name(quorum), |quorum|) such that |S(x) ∩ correct (F)| = |quorum| = y, which completes the proof of the liveness property.
Proof of the safety property of AΣ. 
Thus we have T 1 = quorum i 1 = sigma
, and
. It follows from the safety property of Σ that sigma
which concludes the proof of the safety property.
Proof of boundedness and quiescence.
Since there is a bounded number of processes, the number of possible quorums output by a failure detector Σ is clearly bounded. It follows that both all the sets a_sigma and sent are bounded. Moreover, since each process broadcasts a quorum at most once, not only the content but also the number of messages is bounded, from which follows the quiescence property.
The AS[Σ] model assumes that the communication channels are reliable in the sense that there is no loss, no duplication, and no creation of messages. Actually, the reader can check that the previous construction is not only bounded and quiescent, but remains correct when messages are finitely duplicated.
Σ and AΣ are equivalent in AS: From AΣ to Σ
The construction The algorithm that builds failure detector Σ in AS[AΣ] is described in Fig. 3 . It relies on two main data structures at each process p i .
-alive i is a queue, always containing all the process indexes, that is managed as follows. When p i receives a message from p j , it reorders j and places it at the head of that queue. In that way, the processes that are alive (i.e., those that send messages) appear at the head of alive i , while the processes that have crashed are progressively moved at its tail. According to these data structures, the behavior of a process p i is made up of three tasks T 1, T 2 and T 3.
-T 1 is an infinite loop in which p i repeatedly broadcasts a message alive(i, labels i ) that contains the names of the quorums it knows (i.e., those that are in a_sigma i ). -T 2 is the matching task of T 1. When process p i receives alive( j, labels), it first updates alive i accordingly (line 6). Then, for each quorum name it knows (line 7), it updates its current view of the processes that know x (i.e., the processes p j that have (x, −) in their a_sigma j , lines 8-9). -T 3 is the core of the construction. It is an infinite loop whose aim is to define the current value of sigma i (the local output of Σ). p i first computes a set candidates that contains all the pairs (x, y) ∈ a_sigma i such that 
Hence, r _min = 7 and (x, y) = (5, 4) defines the queue prefix whose identities are "first" in alive i . Consequently sigma i is set to queue i [5] Fig. 3 builds Σ in AS [AΣ] .
Theorem 3 The algorithm described in
Proof Proof of the safety property of Σ.
We have to show that ∀ τ 1 , τ 2 ∀i 1 , i 2 ∈ Π sigma
Let us first observe that a set assigned to sigma i is never empty (lines 14 and 18). When the set Π is the value of sigma i (line 14), the safety property is trivially satisfied. Hence, let us consider two processes p i 1 ). It then follows directly from the safety property of AΣ that T 1 ∩ T 2 = ∅, and consequently, sigma
= ∅, which concludes the proof of the safety property of Σ.
Proof of the liveness property of Σ.
Let us consider an execution with a given failure pattern F. We have to show that ∃τ, ∀i ∈ correct (F) ∀τ ≥ τ sigma τ i ⊆ correct (F). Let τ 0 be the time instant at which all faulty processes have crashed, all messages alive(−, −) sent by faulty pro- cesses have been received and processed, and each correct process has received a message alive(−, −) from each correct process after it has received all the messages from faulty processes. It follows from lines 3 and 6 that, from time τ 0 , the correct processes are always before the faulty processes in alive i (for any correct process p i ).
Moreover, due to the monotonicity and liveness properties of AΣ, there is a time τ 1 from which there is a pair (x, y) ∈ a_sigma i such that |S(x) ∩ correct (F)| ≥ y. This means that there are at least y correct processes in S(x). All the time instants considered in the rest of the proof of the liveness property are time instants after max(τ 0 , τ 1 ).
Let us consider such a pair (x, y) ∈ a_sigma i (as defined above). Each process p j with j ∈ S(x)∩correct (F) broadcasts forever alive( j, labels) with x ∈ labels (line 3). As each process p i such that i ∈ S(x) ∩ correct (F) receives these messages, it executes lines 8-9, hence the processes in S(x) ∩ correct (F) remain forever in queue i [x] , which means that we eventually have forever |queue i [x]| ≥ |S(x) ∩ correct (F)| ≥ y and then (x, y) ∈ candidates, which means that the predicate of line 12, (candidates = ∅), remains forever false.
As, after τ = max(τ 0 , τ 1 ), the faulty processes remain forever at the tail of alive i (see Fig. 4 ), it follows that the pair (x , y ) that is selected at lines 15-17 to define the current value of sigma i , is such that the processes that belong to 
Reductions in the anonymous model AAS
The impossibility to build a failure detector D1 from a failure detector D2 in AS remains obviously true in AAS (this is because, when looking to an anonymous system, anonymity does provide processes with additional information). Formally, as stated in Sect. 4 (under its contrapositive form), for any two failure detectors D1 and D2 we have:
It follows that we only need to check if the reductions that exist in a non-anonymous system still exist in its anonymous counterpart.
A list of reductions
Most of the reductions in the standard model do not hold in the anonymous model. The following proofs are often simple and thus briefly explained in the following. As an example, the reduction between AP and AΩ is proved in details. In AAS:
-P and P are incomparable. There is no reduction from one to the other since there is no way for processes, in the anonymous model, to discover indexes of alive (resp. faulty) processes when their failure detectors provide them only with indexes of faulty (resp. alive) processes. -AP and AP are equivalent. The reductions proposed in Sect. 4.1 for non-anonymous model remain valid since they do not use indexes. It is sufficient to subtract from n the output of one of these detector to emulate the output of the other. -Ω and AΩ are incomparable. On the one side, there exists no algorithm that can build Ω in AAS[AΩ] since it is not possible to associate identities with processes. On the other side, there exists no algorithm that builds AΩ in AAS[Ω] since the processes being anonymous, none of them can discover it is the eventual leader. Σ and AΣ cannot be compared for the same reasons. -AP (resp. AP) is stronger than AΣ. Since n is known, the reduction consists in permanently outputting the pair (0, n − ancp i ) (resp. the pair (0, anap i )) where ancp i (resp. anap i ) is p i 's local output of AP (resp. AP). -P is not stronger than Σ and Ω. Indeed there is no way for processes, in the anonymous model, to discover indexes of correct processes when their failure detectors provide them only with indexes of faulty processes. -Due to the absence of identities, AP (resp. AP) are not stronger than P, P, Σ, and Ω. -P is stronger than AP (take the cardinality of the output set) and thus also stronger than AΣ by transitivity since AΣ ≺ AAS AP and AP ≺ AAS P.
-P is stronger than Σ (take the output of P), stronger than Ω (take the smallest identity output by P), stronger than AP (take the cardinal of the output of P), and thus also stronger than AΣ by transitivity since AΣ ≺ AAS AP and AP ≺ AAS P. -P (resp. P) and AΩ cannot be compared. Indeed, as the system is anonymous, there is no way for the processes to break asymmetry and elect a leader.
A P and AΩ are incomparable in AAS
Theorem 4 It is impossible to construct A P in AAS[AΩ], and it is impossible to construct AΩ in AAS[AP].
Proof From AP to A : impossibility.
Let us remember that all the processes execute the same code. Whatever the code they execute, there is a run in which all the processes are correct and they all proceed at the same speed and read exactly the same value from their failure detector variable ancp i . In such a run, there is no way to break the symmetry in order to distinguish a process from the other processes. It follows that AΩ cannot be built. This construction contradicts the fact that it is impossible to build P in AS [Ω] . It follows that T cannot exist.
Hierarchy and implementability of failure detectors
The reductions among the failure detectors that have been previously described are summarized in Fig. 5 tions in non-anonymous systems are described on the left, while the reductions for anonymous systems are described on the right. An arrow from D1 to D2 means that D2 is weaker than D1 in the corresponding system model. Differently, the absence of an arrow from D1 to D2 means that D2 cannot be built from D1. Failure detectors are introduced to capture the additional power required to solve a problem that is otherwise unsolvable in the considered system. While a (non-trivial) failure detector cannot be implemented in a pure asynchronous system, it is interesting to investigate if it can be implemented in a synchronous system. When such an implementation does exist, the failure detector is realistic [12] .
Considering Fig. 5 , a square indicates that the associated failure detector can be implemented in the corresponding synchronous system, while an ellipses denotes it cannot. As P can be easily implemented in a non-anonymous synchronous system, by reduction all the proposed failure detectors are realistic in AS. As far anonymous synchronous systems are concerned we have the following.
-As there is no notion of process identity, P, P, Σ and Ω cannot be implemented in an anonymous synchronous system. -AP, AP and AΣ can be implemented in an anonymous synchronous system. At every round r , any alive process broadcasts a heartbeat message and counts the number h r of heartbeats received during that round. This number defines the current output of AP, the integer n−h r defines the current output of AP and the pair (0, h r ) defines the current output of AΣ. -AΩ cannot be implemented in an anonymous synchronous system. Indeed even if the system is synchronous there is no deterministic solution for processes to break the symmetry between them.
The important point is that AΩ is not a realistic failure detector in an anonymous system. Despite this fact, AΩ remains important from a theoretical point of view as it is relevant in the search for the "weakest failure detector" for anonymous consensus (see Sect. 7).
An AΣ-based communication abstraction
This section defines and presents an implementation of a communication abstraction that allows the upper layer to benefit from AΣ while hiding the communication pattern required to benefit from it. This abstraction, which will be used in Sect. 6 to obtain a simple consensus algorithm based on the pair of failure detectors AΣ, AΩ , could also be used to solve other problems addressed in the context of anonymous asynchronous systems enriched with AΣ.
Definition of an AΣ-based communication abstraction
This abstraction provides the processes with an operation denoted a_sigma_broadcast(). This operation has two input parameters tag and est, and outputs a set of values s_rec.
The parameter est denotes the value that the invoking process wants to broadcast. The parameter tag is the identity of the corresponding invocations of a_sigma_broadcast(). This operation is a one-shot operation which means that, given a value of tag, it is assumed that a process invokes at most once a_sigma_broadcast(tag, −). Hence, a given value tag identifies the set (of at most n) strongly related invocations of a_sigma_broadcast(tag, −).
Definition The behavior of the invocations a_sigma_ broadcast(tag, −) is defined by the following properties.
-Termination. Let us assume that all the correct processes invoke a_sigma_broadcast(tag, −). Any of these invocations terminates. 
An algorithm implementing a_sigma_broadcast()
Description of the implementation
An implementation of a_sigma_broadcast(tag, est) is described in Fig. 6 . As previously indicated, the parameter tag identifies a set of invocations while est denotes the value that the invoking process wants to broadcast. This implementation uses sequence numbers locally denoted sn i at process p i . The invoking process p i first reads the current value of a_sigma i to extract the set of labels labels i . It then broadcasts the message msg(tag, sn i , labels i , est) (line 1) in which sn i denotes the current sequence number. Then p i enters a repeat loop which encapsulates a communication pattern (lines 2-12) .
Each time it enters the loop, p i checks if an early termination is possible. This happens when p i has received a message early(tag, s_rec) (line 3). If it is the case, p i forwards this early termination message and returns the corresponding set s_rec to p i .
If there is no early termination, p i checks the predicate of line 4 and returns a set s_rec i if this predicate is satisfied (lines 5-6). This predicate states that there is currently a pair (x, y) in a_sigma i such that p i has received "enough" (namely y) message msg(tag, sn, labels j , −) and -all these message carry the same sub-round number sn (which can be different from sn i ), and -x ∈ label j for the field label j of each of these messages.
The set returned by p i at line 6 contains the estimate values carried by these y messages. Moreover, before returning this set, p i broadcast a message early(tag, s_rec i ) to allow other processes to benefit from its termination.
If the predicate of line 4 is not satisfied, p i checks (line 7) if the set of labels (as defined by a_sigma i ) has changed or if it is late with respect to its current sequence number sn i . If it is the case, p i progresses to the next sequence number, recomputes the current set of labels label i (line 8) and broadcasts a new message msg(tag, sn i , labels i , est) (line 9). Finally, whether the predicate of line 7 is satisfied or not, p i enters again the repeat loop. Fig. 6 is an implementation of the AΣ-based communication abstraction.
Theorem 5 The algorithm described in
Proof Proof of the termination property. Assuming that all the correct processes invoke the operation a_sigma_broadcast() with the same parameter tag, we have to show that they all terminate their invocation, i.e., no correct process loops forever in the repeat loop (lines 02-12).
If a process loops forever, it follows from line 3 that, no correct process has sent an early(tag, −) message which means that all correct processes are looping forever in their invocations of a_sigma_broadcast(tag, −).
It follows from the liveness property of AΣ that there is a finite time τ after which, for each correct process p i , there is a pair (x, y) ∈ a_sigma i such that |S(x)∩correct (F)| ≥ y. Due to (a) the definition of S(x) = { j | ∃τ ∈ N, (x, −) ∈ a_sigma τ j }, (b) the fact that, after a finite time, S(x) contains at least y correct processes, and (c) the repeated broadcast by the correct processes of msg(tag, −, −, −) messages with increasing sequence numbers, it follows that there is necessarily a sequence sn during which p i receives y messages msg(tag, sn, labels j , −) with x ∈ labels j , and the predicate of line 4 is then satisfied, from which the termination property follows.
Proof of the validity property. This proof follows directly from the observation that any message msg(tag, −, −, est) broadcast by p i (at lines 1 or 10) is such that est is the value of the input parameter of its invocation of a_sigma_broadcast(tag, −).
Proof of the intersection property.
Considering the invocations a_sigma_broadcast(tag, −), let s_rec i be the set returned by a process p i at line 6. This means that the predicate of line 4 is satisfied, i.e., ∃ (x 1 , y 1 ) ∈ a_sigma i such that the process p i has received y 1 messages msg(tag, sn1, labels k , −) carrying the same sequence number sn1 and such that x 1 ∈ labels k (each message carrying its own value labels k ). Let T 1 ⊆ S(x 1 ) be the set of processes that have sent these y 1 messages, hence |T 1 | = y 1 .
In a similar way, let p j be a process whose invocation a_sigma_broadcast(tag, −) returns the set s_rec j at line 6. Hence, the predicate of line 4 is satisfied, i.e., there is pair (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ a_sigma j such that p j has received y 2 messages msg(tag, sn2, labels k , −) carrying the same sequence number sn2 and such that x 2 ∈ labels k (each message carrying its own value labels k ). Let T 2 ⊆ S(x 2 ) be the set of processes that have sent these y 2 messages, hence |T 2 | = y 2 .
It follows from the safety of AΣ that T 1 ∩ T 2 = ∅. Hence, there is a process p , such that ∈ T 1 ∩ T 2 , that has sent the message msg(tag, sn1, labels , v) to p i (and we have v ∈ s_rec i ) and the message msg(tag, sn2, labels , v ) to p j (and we have v ∈ s_rec j ). But p does not change its estimate value est while executing the repeat loop from which follows that v = v = est. Consequently, est ∈ s_rec i and est ∈ s_rec j , which concludes the proof of the theorem.
A consensus algorithm for AAS[AΣ, AΩ]
Why (AΣ, AΩ)? As indicated in the Introduction, the fact that (1) (Σ, Ω) is the weakest failure detector to solve consensus in a non-anonymous system, (2) (Σ, Ω) are useless in anonymous systems, and (3) (AΣ, AΩ) is the identity-free counterpart of (Σ, Ω) was one of our motivations for designing an (AΣ, AΩ)-based uniform anonymous consensus algorithm.
The consensus problem
The consensus problem has been defined in the Introduction. Each process proposes a value and (at least) the correct processes have to decide a value. The problem can be defined more precisely by the following properties (which means that, to be correct, any run of any algorithm that pretends to solve consensus has to satisfy these properties).
-Termination. Every correct process decides on a value. -Integrity. A process decides at most once. -Validity. A decided value is a proposed value. -Agreement. No two processes decide on different values.
Notation
A process p i uses 5 local variables denoted r i , est1 i , s_rec1 i , est2 i and s_rec2 i (their meaning is described below). Each of them is written exactly once during a round but est1 i which can be written 0, 1 or two times during a round.
Let lvar i be any of s_rec1 i , est2 i , or s_rec2 i . The notation lvar i [r ] is used to denote the value of lvar i after it has been assigned by p i during round r . As each of the concerned local variables is assigned exactly once during a round, there is no ambiguity.
Description of the (AΣ, AΩ)-based consensus algorithm
This algorithm, which works in strongly anonymous systems (i.e., systems where n is not known by the processes) borrows its "three-phase per round" structure from the (non-anonymous) consensus algorithm presented in [26] . Differently from that algorithm, the message exchange patterns used inside the second and third phases are encapsulated inside the previously defined a_sigma_broadcast() communication abstraction. The algorithm is described in Fig. 7 . As already indicated, it is round-based: each process executes a sequence of asynchronous rounds until it decides. A process p i invokes the operation propose(v i ) (where v i is the value it proposes). It decides when it executes the statement return(v) (line 11 or 17, where v is the value it decides). As in other nonanonymous consensus algorithms, when a process decides it stops participating in the consensus algorithm. Consequently, before deciding, a process p i broadcasts a message decide(v) in order to prevent the other processes from blocking forever waiting for a message that p i will never send.
The three main local variables associated with a round are r i (the local round number), and a pair of estimates of the decision value denoted est1 i and est2 i . The variable est1 i contains p i 's current estimate of the decision value when a new round starts while est2 i , whose value is computed during every round, contains either a new estimate of the decision value or a default value ⊥.
In a round r , a process p i executes three phases, denoted phase 0, 1, and 2 which are as follows. The first phase of a round is the only one where AΩ is used, while AΣ is used only in the two other phases through invocations of the communication abstraction a_sigma_broadcast().
The two instances of a_sigma_broadcast() invoked during a round r use unambiguously the tag values 2 × r and 2 × r + 1, respectively.
-First phase of round r . In the first phase of a round, a process p i that considers itself as the leader broadcasts a message phase0(r i , v). If a_leader i is false, p i waits for a message phase0(r, v), adopts v as its new estimate and forwards phase0(r i , v) to all (this forwarding is used to prevent other processes from blocking forever in that phase of round r ). -Second phase of round r . Similarly to [25] , the aim of the second phase of a round r is to assign a value to the variables est2 i in such a way that the following round property denoted P(r ) is always satisfied: Proof The proof is by contradiction. Assuming that no process decides and all correct processes block forever, let r be the smallest round number at which a process blocks forever and let p i be such a correct process. It can be blocked in the wait until statement in phase 0 (line 5), during the invocation of a_sigma_broadcast(2r, −) (line 8) or the invocation of a_sigma_broadcast(2r + 1, −) (line 10). Phase 0. If p i is the eventual leader it cannot block forever in phase 0. So, let p , = i, be the eventual leader. Process p cannot be blocked forever at phase 0 of round r either because a_leader becomes eventually true, or because p receives a message phase0(r, −). Whatever the case, p broadcasts phase0(r, −), and eventually p i receives it. Hence, no correct process can block forever in phase 0 of round r . Phase 1. As r is the first round during which a correct process blocks forever and no correct process blocks forever at line 8, let us assume that a correct process blocks forever at line 8. It follows that all the correct processes eventually enter round r and invoke a_sigma_broadcast(2r, −). Consequently, the assumption required by the termination property of a_sigma_broadcast() is satisfied. It then follows from that property that all the correct processes terminate their invocation of a_sigma_broadcast(2r, −) and no correct process blocks forever at line 8.
Phase 2. The proof that no correct process can block at line 10 is the same as the previous one (after having replaced the tag value 2r by 2r + 1).
Lemma 2 Every correct process eventually decides.
Proof Before deciding at line 11, a process broadcasts a message decide(−). Hence, if a process decides, all correct processes decide. Hence, let us assume, by contradiction, that no process decides.
Due to the definition of AΩ, there is a time τ 0 from which there is exactly one correct process (say p ) whose Boolean variable a_leader remains forever true, while all other a_leader i Boolean variables remain forever false. Let τ 1 be a time after which all faulty processes have crashed. Finally, let τ ≥ max(τ 0 , τ 1 ).
Due to Lemma 1, this means that there is a round r , entered by the correct processes after τ , from which p is the only process such that a_leader = true. Process p is consequently the only process to broadcast phase0(r, v) with v = est1 (line 7) and each correct process receives this message (either directly from p or after forwarding by another process). The important point here is that each correct process p i is such that est1 i = v after it has executed line 6. Hence, they all broadcast phase0(r, v) at line 7.
It follows that each correct process executes round r and invokes a_sigma_broadcast(2r, v) (line 8). Due to Lemma 1 no correct process remains blocked at line 8. It then follows from the validity property of a_sigma_broadcast (2r, −) that each correct process p i obtains s_rec1 i = {v} and invokes a_sigma_broadcast (2r + 1, v) .
Finally, using the same arguments as before, each correct process p i obtains s_rec2 i = {v}, executes line 11 and decides contradicting the initial assumption and thereby completing the proof of the consensus termination property. 
Lemma 4 No two processes decide on different values.
Proof If no process decides or a single process decides at line 11, the consensus agreement property is trivially satisfied. Moreover, if a process decides at line 17, it decides a value that has been sent at line 11. Hence, let us consider that two processes decide at line 11 and let r be the first round at which a process decides. Let p i be a process that decides at that round, and v the value it decides. Let p j be another process that decides at round r ≥ r . We consider two cases.
Case 1: p j decides at round r = r . As p i decides v during round r , we have s_rec2 i [r ] = {v} (line 11). It follows from the intersection property of a_sigma_broadcast(2r +1, −) that s_rec2 i [r ] ∩ s_rec2 j [r ] = ∅ from which we conclude that v ∈ s_rec2 j [r ] . As p j decides, s_rec2 j [r ] contains a single value which (due to the previous argument) is necessarily v and the consensus agreement property follows.
Case 2: p j decides at round r > r . Hence, p j proceeds from r to r + 1. In that case, during round r , we have s_rec2 j [r ] = {v}.
As s_rec2 Consequently, any process p j that proceeds to the round r + 1 executes line 12 and we have est1 j = v when it starts the round r +1. Said another way, v is the only estimate value present in round r +1, from which follows that no other value can be decided at line 11 in a round r > r , which completes the proof of the consensus agreement property. Fig. 7 solves the consensus problem in AAS [AΣ, AΩ] .
Theorem 6 The algorithm described in
Proof The consensus integrity property follows directly from the observation that a process stops participating in the algorithm as soon as it has invoked the statement return().
The consensus validity property (a decided value is a proposed value) follows directly from the validity property of a_sigma_omega() and the following observations O1 and O2. All the est1 i variables are initialized to proposed values (O1). A decided value is a non-⊥ value of an est2 i local variable, which has been assigned the value of an est1 j variable (O2).
The proof of consensus agreement follows from Lemma 4. The proof of consensus termination follows from Lemma 2.
On the weakest FD for anonymous consensus
Failure detector-based consensus algorithms The previous section has presented an (AΣ, AΩ)-based anonymous consensus algorithm. A (non-uniform) AP-based consensus algorithm has been presented in [6] . A natural question is then: "which of (AΣ, AΩ) and AP is the weakest to solve consensus in anonymous systems ?" Unfortunately (AΣ, AΩ) and AP cannot be compared in AAS (the proof is similar to the ones that appear in Sect. 4.1).
Notion of weakest failure detector for a given problem [9] Given a problem P and a failure detector D, D is the weakest failure detector for P in X X [∅] (where X X stands for AS or AAS) if (a) there is an algorithm that solves P in X X [D] , and (b) for any failure detector D such that P can be solved in X X [D ], we have D D . It is shown in [20] that, in AS [∅] , any problem has a weakest failure detector.
New failure detectors Given two failure detectors D1 and D2, let us define a new failure detector D1 ⊕ D2 as follows. During an arbitrary but finite period of time, D1 ⊕ D2 outputs ⊥ at every process, and then behaves either as D1 or as D2 at all processes.
Let us observe that, if D1 and D2 cannot be compared, D1 (resp.,D2) is strictly stronger that D1 ⊕ D2. This is because D1 ⊕ D2 can trivially be built in X X [D1] (resp., X X [D2]), while D1 (resp.,D2) cannot be built in X X [D1 ⊕ D2].
Weakest failure detector for consensus in AAS Whereas (Σ, Ω) is the weakest failure detector for consensus in nonanonymous systems, (AΣ, AΩ) is not the weakest failure detector for anonymous consensus, due to the absence of reduction between AP and AΩ. Hence, let us introduce the new failure detector (AΣ, AΩ) ⊕ AP which is strictly weaker than both (AΣ, AΩ) and AP. Interestingly, there is a simple algorithm that solves anonymous consensus in the system AAS[(AΣ, AΩ) ⊕ AP]. This algorithm is as follows. Each process p i waits until the output of (AΣ, AΩ) ⊕ AP is different from ⊥. Then, according to the actual output of the failure detector (that is non-deterministic), it executes either the (AΣ, AΩ)-based algorithm presented in Sect. 6 or the AP-based algorithm described in [6] .
A question Is (AΣ, AΩ)⊕ AP the weakest failure detector for solving anonymous consensus. This question is motivated by the observation that in a non-anonymous system we have (Σ, Ω) ⊕ P AS (Σ, Ω) which is the weakest failure detector for consensus.
Conclusion
This paper was on failure detectors in anonymous systems. It has presented three main contributions. The first is the introduction of AΣ the identity-free quorum failure detector. The paper has shown that it is the anonymous counterpart of Σ the quorum failure detector (which means that they are equivalent in non-anonymous systems). The paper has also investigated the identity-free perfect detector AP and presented a quiescent bounded construction that builds the failure detector P in non-anonymous asynchronous systems enriched with AP.
The paper has also introduced a new communication abstraction that provides processes with a quorum-like intersection property on the sets of delivered messages. This abstraction, which favors modularity, hides an AΣ-based communication pattern which involves a finite number of internal asynchronous communication phases.
The paper has then presented and proved a consensus algorithm for strongly anonymous systems enriched with the failure detector AΩ (the identity-free eventual leader failure detector) and the failure detector AΣ. The consensus algorithm that is obtained is not trivial and does not require the knowledge of total number of participating processes. Its design relies on the new communication abstraction introduced in the paper.
Finally, the paper has discussed the hierarchy notion of failure detectors in both anonymous and non-anonymous systems. It has also discussed the notion of "weakest failure detector" for anonymous consensus, and shown that, differently from their non-anonymous counterparts P and (Ω, Σ), the identity-free failure detectors AP and (AΩ, AΣ) cannot be compared.
